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This paper reviews the current conditions in the U.S. telecommunications
industry.  It first examines the impact of technological and regulatory change on
market structure and business strategy, and then the impact on pricing of digitization
and the emergence of internet telephony.  Then the paper considers the effects of the
1996 Telecommunications Act on market structure and strategy in conjunction with
the history of regulation and antitrust intervention in the telecommunications sector.
After discussing the impact of wireless technologies, the paper concludes with some
short-term predictions, as well as concern about the derailment of the implementation
of the 1996 Act by aggressive legal tactics of entrenched monopolists (the local
exchange carriers), and the real danger that the intent of Congress in passing the 1996
Act to promote competition in telecommunications will not be realized.
Presently, the U.S. telecommunications industry is going through a revolutionary change.  There
are three reasons for this.
The first reason is the rapid technological change in key inputs of telecommunications
services and in complementary goods, which have reduced dramatically the costs of traditional
services and have made many new services available at reasonable prices.   Cost reductions have
made feasible the world wide web (“WWW”) and the various multimedia applications that “live”
on it.
The second reason for the revolutionary change has been the sweeping digitization of the
telecommunications and the related sectors.  The underlying telecommunications technology has
become digital. Moreover, the consumer and business telecommunications interfaces have
become more versatile and closer to multifunction computers than to traditional telephones.
Digitization and integration of telecommunications services with computers create significant
business opportunities and impose significant pressure on traditional pricing structures,
especially in voice telephony.
The third reason for the current upheaval in the telecommunications sector was the passage
of a major new law to govern telecommunications in the United States, the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (1996 Act).  Telecommunications has been traditionally subject to a complicated
federal and state regulatory structure.  The 1996 Act attempted to adapt the regulatory structure
to technological reality, but various legal challenges by the incumbents have so far delayed, if not
nullified, its impact.
Before going into a detailed analysis, it is important to point out the major driving forces in
U.S. telecommunications today:
1.  Dramatic reductions in the costs of transmission and switching;
2.  Digitization;
3.  Restructuring of the regulatory environment through the implementation of the 1996
Telecommunications Act coming twelve years after the breakup of AT&T;
4.  Move of value from underlying services (such as transmission and switching) to the interface and
content;
5.  Move toward multifunction programmable devices with programmable interfaces, such as
computers, and away from single-function, nonprogrammable consumer devices, such as
traditional telephone appliances;
6.  Reallocation of electromagnetic spectrum, allowing for new types of wireless competition;
7.  Interconnection and interoperability of interconnected networks; standardization of
communications protocols;
8.  Network externalities and critical mass.
These forces have a number of consequences:
1.  Increasing pressure for cost-based pricing of telecommunications services;
2.  Price arbitrage between services of the same time immediacy requirement;
3.  Increasing competition in long distance services;
4.  The possibility of competition in local services;
5.  The  emergence of internet telephony as a major new telecommunications technology.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic reductions in costs of transmission through
the use of  technology, reductions in costs of switching and information processing because of
big reductions of costs of integrated circuits and computers; and very significant improvements
in software interfaces.  Cost reductions and better interfaces have made feasible many data- and
transmission-intensive services.  These include many applications on the world wide web, which
were dreamed of many years ago but only now became economically feasible.
The general trend in cost reductions has allowed for entry of more competitors in many
components of the telecommunications network and an intensification of competition.
Mandatory interconnection of public telecommunications networks and the use of common
standards for interconnection and interoperability created a “network of networks,” i.e., a web of
interconnected networks.  The open architecture of the network of networks allowed for entry of
new competitors in markets for particular components, as well as in markets for integrated end-
to-end services.  Competition intensified in many, but not all, markets.
Digital Convergence and “Bit Arbitrage”
Entry and competition were particularly helped by the open architecture of the network and
its increasing digitization.  Currently, all voice messages are digitized close to their origination
and are carried in digital form over most of the network.  Thus, the data and voice networks are
one, with voice treated as data with specific time requirements.  This has important implications
on pricing and market structure.
Digital bits (zeros or ones) traveling on the information highway can be parts of voice, still
pictures, video, or of a database or other computer application, and they appear identical, “a bit is
a bit is a bit.”  However, because some demands are for real-time services while others are not,
the saying that “a bit is a bit is a bit” is correct only among services that have the same index of
time immediacy.  Digitization implies arbitrage on the price of bit transmission among services
that have the same time immediacy requirements.
For example, voice telephony and video conferencing require real-time transmission and
interaction.  Digitization implies that the cost of transmission of voice is hundreds of times
smaller than the cost of transmitting video of the same duration.  This implies that, if
regulatorily-imposed price discrimination is eliminated, arbitrage on the price of bits will occur,
leading to extremely low prices for services, such as voice, that use relatively very few bits.
Even if price discrimination remains imposed by regulation, arbitrage in the cost and pricing of
bits will lead to pressures for a de facto elimination of discrimination.  This creates significant
profit opportunities for the firms that are able to identify the arbitrage opportunities and exploit
them.
Internet Telephony
The elimination of price discrimination between voice and data services can lead to dramatic
reductions in the price of voice calls, precipitating significant changes in market structure.  These
changes were first evident in the emergence of the Internet, a ubiquitous network of applications
based on the TCPIP protocol.  Started as a text-based network for scientific communication, the
Internet grew dramatically in the late 1980s and 1990s, once not-text-only applications became
available.1 The Internet now reaches about half a billion computers, most of which are connected
through the telephone network.  Internet-based telecommunications are based on TCPIP packet
switching.  There are two modes of operation: a time-delay mode in which there is a guarantee
that system will do whatever it can to deliver all packets; and a real-time mode, in which packets
can in fact be lost without possibility of recovery.
Most telecommunications services do not have a real-time requirement, so applications that
“live” on the Internet can easily accommodate them.  For example, there are currently a number
of companies that provide facsimile services on the Internet, where all or part of the transport of
the fax takes place over the Internet.  Although the Internet was not intended to be used in real-
time telecommunications, in spite of the loss of packets, presently telecommunications
companies use the Internet to complete ordinary voice telephone calls.  Voice
telecommunications service started on the Internet as a computer to computer call.  About three
years ago, Internet telecommunications companies started offering termination of calls on the
public switched network.  In 1996, firms started offering Internet calling that originated and
terminated on the public switched network (“PSTN”), i.e., from and to the regular customers’
phone appliances.  The last two transitions became possible with the introduction of PSTN-
Internet interfaces and switches by Lucent and others.
Internet calls are TCPIP-packet based. Because they utilize the real time mode of the
Internet, there is no guarantee that all the packets of a voice transmission will arrive to the
destination.  Internet telephony providers use sophisticated voice sampling methods to
decompose and reconstitute voice, so that packet losses do not make a significant audible
difference.  Because such methods are by their nature imperfect, the quality and fidelity of an
Internet call depends crucially on the percentage of packets that are lost in transmission and
transport.  This, in turn, depends, among other factors, on the allocation of internet bandwidth
(pipeline) to the phone call, and on the number of times the message is transmitted.2
Internet-based telecommunications services pose a serious threat to traditional
telecommunications services providers, especially long-distance service providers.  In the present
U.S. regulatory structure, a call originating from a computer to an Internet service provider
(“ISP”) (or terminates to a computer) is not charged an “access charges” by the local exchange
carrier.  This can lead to substantial savings.
In response to the Internet telephony threat, on January 26, 1998, AT&T announced that it
will offer a new long distance service carried over the Internet and intranet.  AT&T’s service
offered at 7.5-to 9 cents per minute, will originate and terminate on the public switched network
(“PSTN”) and therefore will appear to customers like a regular call; no computer will be
required.  In November 1997, Deutsche Telecom (DT) introduced Internet long-distance service
within Germany.  To compensate for the lower quality of voice transmission, DT offers Internet
long distance at one-fifth of its regular long-distance rates.  Internet telephony is the most
important challenge to the telecommunications sector.
THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT AND ITS IMPACT
Goals of the Act
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 attempts a major restructuring of the U.S.
telecommunications sector.  The 1996 Act will be judged favorably to the extent that it allows
and facilitates the acquisition by consumers of the benefits of technological advances.  Such a
function requires the promotion of competition in all markets.  This does not mean immediate
and complete deregulation.  Consumers must be protected from monopolistic abuses in some
markets as long as such abuses are feasible under the current market structure.  Moreover, the
regulatory framework must safeguard against firms exporting their monopoly power in other
markets.
In passing the 1996 Act Congress took radical steps to restructure U.S. telecommunications
markets.  These steps may result in very significant benefits to consumers of telecommunications
services, telecommunications carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers.  But
the degree of success of the 1996 Act depends crucially on its implementation through decisions
of the Federal Communication Commission and state public utility commissions and the outcome
of the various court challenges that these decisions face.
The 1996 Act envisions a network of interconnected networks composed of complementary
components that generally provide both competing and complementary services.  The 1996 Act
uses both structural and behavioral instruments to accomplish its goals.  The Act attempts to
reduce regulatory barriers to entry and competition.  It outlaws artificial barriers to entry in local
exchange markets in an attempt to accomplish the maximum possible competition.  Moreover, it
mandates interconnection of telecommunications networks, unbundling, nondiscrimination, and
cost-based pricing of leased parts of the network, so that competitors can enter easily and
compete component by component and service by service.
The 1996 Act imposes conditions to ensure that de facto monopoly power is not exported to
vertically related markets.  Thus, the Act requires that competition be established in local
markets before the incumbent local exchange carriers are allowed in long distance.
The Act preserves subsidized local service to achieve “Universal Service” but imposes the
requirement that subsidization be transparent and that subsidies be raised in a competitively
neutral manner.  Thus, the Act leads the way to the elimination of subsidization of Universal
Service through the traditional method of high access charges.
The 1996 Act crystallized changes that had become necessary because of technological
progress.  Rapid technological change has always been the original cause of regulatory change.
The radical transformation of the regulatory environment and market conditions that are
presently taking place as a result of the 1996 Act are no exception.
History
Telecommunications has traditionally been a regulated sector of the U.S. economy.
Regulation was imposed in the early part of this century and remains until today in various parts
of the industry.3  The main idea behind regulation was that it was necessary because the market
for telecommunications services was a natural monopoly, and therefore a second competitor
would not survive.
As early as 1900, it was clear that all telecommunications markets were not natural
monopolies, as evidenced by the existence of more than one competing firm in many regional
markets, prior to the absorption of most of them in the Bell System.  Over time, it became clear
that some markets were not natural monopolies any more, and that it was better to allow
competition in those markets while keeping the rest regulated.
The market for telecommunication services and for telecommunications equipment went
through various stages of competitiveness since the invention of the telephone by Alexander
Graham Bell.  After a period of expansion and consolidation, by the 1920 AT&T had an
overwhelming majority of telephony exchanges and submitted to State regulation.  Federal
regulation was instituted by the 1934 Telecommunication Act, which established the Federal
Communications Commission.
Regulation of the U.S. telecommunications market was marked by two important antitrust
lawsuits that the U.S. Department of Justice brought against AT&T.  In the first one, United
States v. Western Electric, filed in 1949, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) claimed that the
Bell Operating Companies practiced illegal exclusion by buying only from Western Electric, a
part of the Bell System.  The government sought a divestiture of Western Electric, but the case
was settled in 1956 with AT&T agreeing not to enter the computer market, but retaining
ownership of Western Electric.
The second major antitrust suit, United States v. AT&T, was started in 1974.  The
government alleged that AT&T’s relationship with Western Electric was illegal, and that AT&T
monopolized the long-distance market.  The DOJ sought divestiture of both manufacturing and
long distance from local service.  The case was settled by the Modified of Final Judgement
(MFJ).  This decree broke away from AT&T seven Regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs).  Each RBOC was comprised of a collection of local telephone companies that were
part of the original AT&T.  RBOCs remained regulated monopolies, each with an exclusive
franchise in its region.
Microwave transmission was a major breakthrough in long-distance transmission that created
the possibility of competition in long distance. The breakup of AT&T crystallized the
recognition that competition was possible in long distance, while the local market remained a
natural monopoly.  The biggest benefits to consumers during the past fifteen years have come
from the long-distance market, which, during this period was transformed from a monopoly to an
effectively competitive market.  However, often consumers do not reap the full benefits of cost
reductions and competition because of an antiquated regulatory framework that, ironically, was
supposed to protect consumers from monopolistic abuses but instead protects the monopolistic
market structure.
Competition in long distance has been a great success.  The market share (in minutes of use)
of AT&T fell from almost 100 percent to 53 percent at the end of 1996.  Since the MFJ, the
number of competitors in the long distance market has increased dramatically.  There are five
large facilities-based competitors: AT&T, MCI, Sprint, LDDS-Worldcom, and Frontier.4  There
is also a large number of “resellers” that buy wholesale service from the facilities-based long-
distance carriers and sell to consumers.  For example, currently, there are about 500 resellers
competing in the California interexchange market, providing very strong evidence for the ease of
entry into this market.  At least twenty new firms entered the California market in each year since
1984.  At present, there are at least five “out of region” RBOCs providing service in California
through affiliates.  In California, the typical consumer can choose from at least 150 long distance
companies.
Prices of long-distance phone calls have decreased dramatically.  The average revenue per
minute of AT&T’s switched services has been reduced by 62 percent between 1984 and 1996.
AT&T was declared “nondominant” in the long-distance market by the FCC in 1995. 5   Most
economists agree that presently the long-distance market is effectively competitive.
RBOCs actively petitioned the U.S. Congress to be allowed to enter the long-distance
market, from which they were excluded by the MFJ.  The MFJ prevented RBOCs from
participation in long distance because of the anticompetitive consequences that this would have
for competition in long distance.  The anticompetitive effects would arise because of the control
by RBOCs of essential “bottleneck” inputs for long-distance services, such as terminating access
to long-distance companies of phone calls to customers that live in the local companies’ area.
A long-distance phone call is carried by the local telephone companies at the place it
originates and the place it terminates, and only in its long-distance part by a long-distance
company.  Thus, “originating access” and “terminating access” are provided by local exchange
carriers to long-distance companies and are essential bottleneck inputs for long-distance service.
Origination and termination of calls are extremely lucrative services.6  Terminating access has an
average cost (in most locations) of $0.002 per minute.  Its regulated prices vary.  A typical price
is $0.032 per minute, charged by NYNEX.  Such pricing implies a profit rate of 1500 percent.7
Access charges reform is one of the key demands of the procompetitive forces in the current
deregulation process.
The great success of competition in long distance allowed the U.S. Congress to appear
“balanced” in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by establishing competition in local
telephony, while allowing RBOCs into long distance after they meet certain conditions.
However, the transition of local markets to effective competition will not be as easy or as quick
as in the long- distance markets.  This is because of the nature of the product and the associated
economics.
Many telecommunications companies are presently trying to be in as many markets as
possible so that they can bundle the various products.  Companies believe that consumers are
willing to pay more for bundled services for which the consumer receives a single bill.  Bundling
also discourages consumers from migrating to competitors, who may not offer the complete
collection of services, so consumer “churn” is expected to be reduced.
Entry in Local Services
Currently, the “last mile” of the telecommunications network closest to the consumer (the
“local loop”) remains a bottleneck controlled by a local exchange carrier (“LEC”).  The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 boldly attempts to introduce competition in this last bottleneck,
and, before competition takes hold, the Act attempts to imitate competition in the local exchange.
To facilitate entry in the local exchange, the Act introduces two novel ways of entry besides
entry through the installation of owned facilities.  The first way allows entry in the retailing part
of the telecommunications business by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to
sell at wholesale prices to entrants any retail service that they offer.  Such entry is essentially
limited to the retailing part of the market.
The second and most significant novel way of entry introduced by the Act is through leasing
of unbundled network elements from incumbents.  In particular, the Act requires that ILECs
unbundle their networks; and that they offer for lease to entrants network components
(unbundled network elements, “UNEs”) “at cost plus reasonable profit.”8  Thus, the Act
envisions the telecommunications network as a decentralized network of interconnected
networks.
Many firms, including the large interexchange carriers AT&T and MCI, attempted to enter
the market through “arbitration” agreements with ILECs under the supervision of state regulatory
commissions, according to the procedure outlined by the Act.  The arbitration process proved to
be extremely long and difficult, with continuous legal obstacles and appeals raised by the ILECs.
To this date (February 1998), two years after the signing of the Act by President Clinton,
arbitrations have been concluded in very few states, and entry in the local exchange has been
minimal.
Entry of RBOCs in Long -Distance Service
RBOCs (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, SBC and USWest) have 89 percent of  the
telephone access lines nationwide.  Most of the remainder belongs to GTE and independent
franchise holders.  Competitive access providers (who did not hold a franchise monopoly) have
less than 1 percent of residential access lines nationwide.  In addition to providing access to long-
distance companies, local exchange carriers also provide lucrative “custom local exchange
services” (CLASS), such as call waiting, conference calling, and automatic number
identification.  Basic local service provided by LECs is considered not to be particularly
profitable.
The Act allows for entry of RBOCs in long distance once a list of requirements has been met,
and the petitioner has proved that its proposal is in the public interest.  These requirements can
be met only when the market for local telecommunications services becomes sufficiently
competitive.  If the local market is not competitive when an incumbent LEC monopolist enters
into long distance, the LEC can leverage its monopoly power to disadvantage its long-distance
rivals by increasing their costs in various ways, and by discriminating against them in its
pricing.9
In allowing entry of local exchange carriers into the long-distance market, the Act tries not to
endanger competition that has developed in long distance by premature entry of  RBOCs in the
long distance market.  However, on this issue, the Act’s provisions guarding against premature
entry may be insufficient.  Hence, to guard against anticompetitive consequences of premature
entry of RBOCs in long distance, there is a need of a deeper analysis of the consequences of such
entry on competition and on consumers’ social welfare.
THE IMPACT OF WIRELESS (CELLULAR, SATELLITE AND PCS) AND CABLE TV
During the past fifteen years there has been a tremendous (and generally unanticipated)
expansion of the mobile phones market.  The very significant growth has been limited by
relatively high prices resulting from the prevention of entry of more than two competitors in each
metropolitan areas; and the standard billing arrangement that imposes a fee on the cellular
customer for receiving (as well as initiating) calls.
However, during the past three years, the FCC has auctioned parts of the electromagnetic
spectrum that will enable the transmission of personal communication services (PCS) signals.10
The auctioned spectrum will be able to support up to five additional carriers in the major
metropolitan markets.11  Although the PCS spectrum band is different than the traditional cellular
bands, PCS is predicted to be a low-cost, high-quality, mobile alternative to traditional phone
service.  Other wireless services may chip away at the ILECs markets,  especially in high
capacity access services.12  The increase in the number of competitors has already created very
significant decreases in prices of mobile phone services.
By its nature, PCS is positioned between fixed local service and traditional wireless
(cellular) service.  Presently there is a very significant price difference between the two services.
Priced between the two, PCS will first draw consumers from cellular in large cities, and later on
will be a serious threat to fixed local service.  AT&T has recently announced that it will use
some of the spectrum that it acquired in the PCS auctions to implement a fixed wireless service
(“telepoint”), a close (and maybe superior) substitute to fixed wire service.13
Industry analysts have been predicting the impending entry of cable television in telephony
for many years.  In spite of numerous trials, such entry in traditional telecommunications services
has not materialized.  There are a number of reasons for this:
1.  To provide telephone service, cable television providers needed to upgrade their networks from
analog to digital.
2.  They need to add switching.
3.  Most of the cable industry has taken a high debt load and is unable to make the required
investments in the short run.
If and when it is able to provide switching, cable television would have a significant
advantage over regular telephone lines.  Cable TV lines that reach the home have a significantly
higher bandwidth capacity that regular twisted pair lines.  This is not important for regular voice
telephony, but it is crucially important for applications on the world wide web that require high
bandwidth capacity.  Companies such as @home and WebTV are utilizing this capacity to
provide bundles of Internet and traditional TV services.  Often these services do not allow for
two-way communication but rather rely on a telephone line for transmissions from the home to
the Internet Service Provider (ISP), who is expected to require only low bandwidth.
THE COMING WORLD
The market structure in the telecommunications sector two years ahead will depend crucially
on the resolution of the LECs legal challenges to the 1996 Telecommunications Act.14  These
challenges have derailed the implementation process of the Act and have increased significantly
the uncertainty in the telecommunications sector.  Long-distance companies have been unable to
enter the local exchange markets by leasing unbundled network elements (UNEs), because the
arbitration process that started in April 1996 has resulted in final prices in only a handful of
states.  Instead, AT&T acquired TCG that owns some local exchange infrastructure, and MCI
merged with Worldcom, which had just merged with Brooks Fiber that also owns some
infrastructure in local exchange markets.  Meanwhile Pacific Bell was acquired by SBC, and
NYNEX by  Bell Atlantic, in spite of antitrust objections, in an attempt of the RBOCs to
maximize their foothold, looking forward to the time when they will be allowed to provide long-
distance service.15
The intent of the 1996 Act was to promote competition and the public interest.  It will be a
significant failure of the U.S. political, legal, and regulatory systems if the interests of entrenched
monopolists rather than the public interest as expressed by the U.S. Congress dictate the future of
the U.S. telecommunications sector.
Whatever the outcomes of the legal battles, the existence of arbitrage and the intensification
of competition necessitate cost-based pricing and will create tremendous pressure on traditional
regulated prices that are not cost-based.  Prices that are not based on cost will prove
unsustainable.
Computers are likely to play a bigger role as telephone appliances and in running
intermediate- size networks that will compete with LECs.  Computer-based telephone interfaces
will become the norm.  Firms that have significant market power in computer  interfaces, such as
Microsoft, may play a significant role in telephony.  Hardware manufacturers, especially firms
like Cisco, Intel, and 3Com that make switches and local networks, will play a much more central
role in telephony.  Internet telephony is expected to grow fast.
Finally, I expect that, slowly but steadily, telecommunications will drift away from the
technical standards of signalling system seven (SS7) established by AT&T before its breakup.
As different methods of transmission and switching take a foothold, and as new interfaces
become available, wars over technical standards are very likely.  This will further transform
telecommunications from the traditional quiet landscape of regulated utilities to the mad dash
world of software and computer manufacturing.  This change will create significant business
opportunities for entrants and impose significant challenges on traditional telecommunications
carriers.
FOOTNOTES
                                                
1. Critical points in this development were the emergence of GOPHER in the late1980s and MOSAIC by
1990.
2
  A large enough bandwidth increases the probability that fewer packets will be lost.  And, if each packet is
send a number of times, it is much more likely that each packet will arrive at the destination at least once,
and the quality of the phone call will not deteriorate.  Thus, the provider can adjust the quality level of an
Internet call by guaranteeing a lot of bandwidth for the transmission, and by sending the packets more than
once.  This implies that the quality of an Internet call is variable and can be adjusted upward using the
variables mentioned.  Thus, high-quality voice telephony is immediately feasible in intranets since intranets
can guarantee a sustained large enough bandwidth.  There is no impediment to the quality level of a phone
call that is picked from the PSTN at the local switch, carried over long distance on leased lines, and
redelivered to the PSTN at the destination local switch, using the recently introduced Lucent switches.  For
Internet calls that originate or terminate in computers,  the method of resending packets can be used on the
Internet to increase the quality of the phone call, as long as there is sufficient bandwidth between the
computer and the local telephone company switch.  The fidelity of calls can also be enhanced by
manipulation of the sound frequencies.  This can be done, for example, through the elemedia series of
products by Lucent.
3
 The telecommunications sector is regulated both by the Federal Government through the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and by all States, typically through a Public Utilities Commission
(“PUC”) or Public Service Commission.  Usually a PUC also regulates electricity companies.
4
 These will be limited to four if the merger of MCI and WORLDCOM is approved by regulators and
antitrust authorities.  Frontier is a new name for Rochester Telephone.
5
  See Federal Communications Commission (1995).
6
  These fees are the single largest cost item in the ledgers of AT&T.
7
 Termination pricing varies. Pacific Bell, under pressure from the California Public Utilities Commission,
now has an access charge of $0.016 per minute, giving it a profit rate of 700%.
8
  The FCC and state regulatory commissions have interpreted these words to mean Total Element Long
Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC), which is the forward looking, long-run, (minimized) economic cost of an
unbundled element and includes the competitive return on capital.
9
  See Economides (1998).
10
  In spite of this and other auctions of spectrum, the FCC does not have a coherent policy of efficient
allocation of electromagnetic spectrum.  For example, recently, the FCC gave for free huge chunks of
electromagnetic spectrum to existing TV stations so that they may provide high definition television.  Some
of the recipients have publicly stated that they intend to use the spectrum to broadcast regular TV channels
and information services, rather than HDTV.
                                                                                                                                                
11
 We don’t expect to see five entrants in all markets because laxity in the financial requirements of bidders
resulted in default of some of the high bidders in the PCS, prompting a significant dispute regarding their
financial and other obligations.
12
  The so-called “wireless loop” proposes to bypass the ILECs cabling with much less outlay for
equipment.  Trials are underway to test certain portions of the radio spectrum that were originally set aside
for other applications: MMDS for “wireless cable” and LMDS as “cellular television.”
13
  The second impediment to wider use of mobile phones seems also likely to disappear.  On January 26,
1998, AT&T announced that it will offer mobile service with billing of incoming calls to the originator of
the call.
14
  In one of the major challenges, GTE and a number of RBOCs appealed (among others) the FCC (1996)
rules on pricing guidelines to the 8th Circuit.  The plaintiffs won the appeal; the FCC appealed to the
Supreme Court, which accepted the case.  A final outcome is expected in October 1998.
15
  Recently, SBC announced its intention to buy Southern New England Telephone (“SNET”) one of the
few companies, which, as an independent, was not bound by MFJ restrictions and has already entered into
long distance.
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